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12 *Class Counsel*

13 **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**
14 **CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**
15 **WESTERN DIVISION**

16 LSIMC, LLC, on behalf of itself and all
17 others similarly situated,

18 Plaintiff,

19 vs.

20 AMERICAN GENERAL LIFE
INSURANCE COMPANY,

21 Defendant.

Case No. 2:20-cv-11518-SVW (PVCx)

**CLASS COUNSEL'S
MEMORANDUM OF
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN
SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION FOR
ATTORNEYS' FEES,
REIMBURSEMENT OF LITIGATION
EXPENSES, AND SERVICE AWARD**

Date: June 26, 2023
Time: 1:30 p.m.
Ctrm: 10A
Judge: Stephen V. Wilson

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1 **I. INTRODUCTION**

2 After two years of hard-fought litigation, and on the eve of trial, Class Counsel
3 settled this complex case concerning the under-crediting of interest rates on universal
4 life insurance (“UL”) policies for an outstanding result: monetary benefits totaling
5 \$55.5 million, and additional non-monetary relief valued at \$9.24 million. The \$55.5
6 million alone in cash and increased interest payments to Settlement Class Members¹
7 is equal to over 44% of the Class’s total possible recovery. When considering the
8 additional \$9.24 million from the Settlement’s non-monetary benefits, the
9 Settlement’s total gross benefits rise to more than \$64.74 million—over 51.5% of
10 Defendant American General (“AmGen”)’s total potential liability. These benefits
11 are exceptional standing alone, but are even more extraordinary when viewed against
12 the significant difficulties Plaintiff faced in this case. *See, e.g., Marshall v. Northrop*
13 *Grumman Corp.*, 2020 WL 5668935, at *2–*3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2020) (settlement
14 for “approximately 29% of Plaintiffs’ claimed damages” was “an exceptional result”
15 warranting an upward adjustment from the 25% benchmark and collecting cases).

16 The Settlement is particularly significant “in light of the long, contentious, and
17 uncertain road that Class Members would have to traverse to receive relief.” Dkt.
18 217 at 2 (Preliminary Approval Order). As the Court observed, “the Class was
19 certified for liability purposes only” and “Plaintiff faced several risks in terms of
20 presenting a theory of damages . . . and converting a liability judgment into actual
21 damages.” *Id.* Those risks were apparent from the beginning. The Court granted
22 AmGen’s second motion to dismiss and gave Plaintiff only 14 days to plead
23 additional facts sufficient to establish “a fuller picture of how Defendant’s interest
24 rates changed over time relative to its investment returns, or what returns could have
25 been reasonably expected when a redetermination was made.” Dkt. 34 at 4. That
26 threshold hurdle was just the beginning of the difficulties Plaintiff faced. Even if a

27 _____
28 ¹ Unless noted, all referenced exhibits are attached to the Declaration of Glenn
Bridgman, and all capitalized terms mean the same as in the Settlement Agreement.
Ex. I. This brief uses the terms “Settlement Class” and “Class” interchangeably.

1 jury found AmGen liable for breach at trial, Class Members would still have faced
2 years of individualized damages trials, and post-trial and appellate litigation to
3 receive any monetary compensation, and could well have received no such
4 compensation even had they prevailed on liability. Yet, this Settlement secures
5 significant and immediate compensation through cash and increased interest
6 payments that counsel for AmGen stated at the preliminary approval hearing “will be
7 paid into the cash value of the policies” such that “[t]here is a 100% likelihood that
8 the accumulation value of the policies will be impacted positively by the settlement.”
9 Ex. 5.

10 The Settlement’s relief directly remedies the misconduct alleged. Plaintiff
11 claimed that AmGen paid lower interest rates than it should have, in violation of
12 contractual terms. The Settlement increases those very same interest rates such that
13 the Class receives higher interest payments, in addition to payments from a cash
14 Settlement Fund. Retired United States District Judge Gary Feess, who supervised
15 the parties in successfully mediating this matter, has submitted a declaration attesting
16 that he “strongly support[s]” this Settlement which was, in his view, “in the best
17 interest of the parties,” and that the “advocacy on both sides of this case was excellent
18 and exemplified the highest levels of professionalism and zealous advocacy.” Dkt.
19 215-4, ¶10 (Decl. of Hon. Gary A. Feess in Support of Preliminary Approval).

20 This is not a case where a prior governmental investigation, criminal
21 conviction, whistleblower, or news exposé paved the way. To the contrary: this is
22 the first lawsuit that counsel is aware of alleging this type of wrongdoing. There
23 have been *no* government investigations at all. Class Counsel performed the initial
24 factual and legal investigation prior to filing this lawsuit, expended thousands of
25 hours thereafter pressing the case forward, and spent substantial amounts in expert
26 fees and other expenses, all with no promise or assurance of any kind that it would
27 receive payment for its services.
28

1 All told, Class Counsel invested more than 3,200 hours in time, and over
2 \$363,000 in expenses, on a fully contingent basis—all with the very real possibility
3 of receiving nothing in return. Among other things, Class Counsel:

- 4 • Advanced the case past three motions to dismiss;
- 5 • Won discovery disputes against AmGen to secure over 163,000 pages of
6 critical documents;
- 7 • Subpoenaed AmGen’s external auditor, securing an additional 3,524 pages
8 of key documents;
- 9 • Won certification of the issue class;
- 10 • Produced six expert reports, and took or defended the deposition of all four
11 testifying experts;
- 12 • Took or defended the Rule 30(b)(6) depositions of AmGen’s and
13 Plaintiff’s corporate representatives;
- 14 • Prepared mediation submissions for, and participated in a full-day
15 mediation with Judge Feess (Ret.);
- 16 • Moved to exclude AmGen’s insurance and actuarial expert, and opposed
17 AmGen’s motion to exclude Plaintiff’s insurance expert;
- 18 • Opposed AmGen’s motion for summary judgment—briefing between the
19 parties which totaled 62 pages with over 1,400 pages of exhibits;
- 20 • Filed seven motions *in limine*; and
- 21 • Filed all pretrial documents, including Plaintiff’s witness list, the parties’
22 joint exhibit list, and Plaintiff’s memorandum of contentions of fact and
23 law.

24 Bridgman Decl. ¶¶15–25.

25 With Judge Feess’s (Ret.) oversight, the parties ultimately signed a Term Sheet
26 only the week before the hearing on AmGen’s motion for summary judgment and the
27 parties’ *Daubert* motions—just two weeks before trial. The Settlement reached on
28 the brink of trial was reached with one of the largest insurance companies in the

1 world, represented by two of the most prestigious law firms in the country with deep
2 insurance experience.

3 Class Counsel respectfully moves this Court for an award of attorneys’ fees of
4 \$8 million to be paid from the Final Settlement Fund, which is approximately 14.4%
5 of the \$55.5 million of monetary benefits viewed in isolation, and 12.4% of the
6 Settlement’s total gross benefits of \$64.74 million. Both percentages are well below
7 the Ninth Circuit’s 25% benchmark in percentage-of-recovery cases. *Vizcaino v.*
8 *Microsoft Corp.*, 290 F.3d 1043, 1047 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he ‘benchmark’ award is
9 25 percent of the recovery obtained, with 20–30% as the usual range.” (cleaned up)).
10 Class Counsel also requests \$363,445.27 for litigation expenses, and a service award
11 of \$25,000 for LSIMC, LLC for its time and effort in helping bring this case to a
12 successful conclusion.

13 II. BACKGROUND

14 A. Class Counsel Investigated Defendant’s Conduct, Filed Suit, and 15 Overcame AmGen’s Motions to Dismiss

16 The Settlement Class consists of owners of over 40,500 UL policies issued by
17 AmGen. UL policies combine the insurance component of a traditional life insurance
18 policy with a savings component: policyholders’ premium payments help make up
19 the policy’s “accumulation value,” which is used to pay for the insurance component,
20 and which also earn interest at rates set by AmGen. Each of the policies at issue have
21 a guaranteed minimum annual interest rate of 3.00%, and contain the following
22 provision:

23 “This policy does not participate in our profits or surplus. . . . **Any**
24 **redetermination of interest rates will be based *only* on expectations**
25 **of future investment earnings.** We will not change these rates or
26 charges in order to recoup any prior losses.”

27 Ex. 3 at 17 (emphasis added). Thus, whenever AmGen redetermines interest rates,
28 Plaintiff alleges they must be based “only on” AmGen’s “expectations of future
investment earnings” (“EFIE”). This lawsuit alleged that AmGen did not
redetermine the interest rates it paid policyholders “based only on EFIE,” resulting

1 in much lower interest payments (“under-crediting”) than contractually required.

2 Prior to filing suit, Class Counsel reviewed AmGen’s public documents
3 concerning its investment returns to form the foundation of the Complaint. In
4 consultation with industry experts, Class Counsel carefully studied the Policies’
5 language, the general trends in investment returns, and the actuarial assumptions
6 underlying the setting and redetermination of interest rates on UL policies. Class
7 Counsel drafted the Complaint and filed this lawsuit on December 21, 2020.

8 Class Counsel then navigated this case past three motions to dismiss, totaling
9 over 140 pages of briefing. Class Counsel continued to carefully assess this case’s
10 merits following each motion to dismiss to respond appropriately. This included
11 hiring—at Class Counsel’s own expense—experts to further analyze paywalled data
12 concerning AmGen’s investment returns in order to meet the Court’s request for “a
13 fuller picture” on how AmGen’s interest rates changed over time compared to its
14 investment returns, or what those interest rates should have been during
15 redeterminations. Dkt. 34 at 4. This task was extremely difficult because insurers
16 treat their EFIE as proprietary and highly confidential (as evidenced by AmGen’s
17 continued requests to seal this exact information, *e.g.*, Dkts. 99, 105, 122, 131, 142).
18 Nevertheless, Class Counsel’s efforts proved successful, and they added over eight
19 pages of allegations related to AmGen’s credited-rate practices in its Second
20 Amended Complaint, which the Court found sufficient under *Twombly/Iqbal* to infer
21 “an unexplained difference between [AmGen’s] rate of return and the New Premiums
22 Rate” that policyholders were earning. Dkt. 45 at 5. Plaintiff defeated AmGen’s third
23 motion to dismiss on September 28, 2021. *Id.*

24 **B. Class Counsel’s Efforts Uncovered Previously Undisclosed AmGen
25 Practices that Resulted in Positive Change Even Before Settlement**

26 Following the Court’s denial of AmGen’s third motion to dismiss, Class
27 Counsel pushed the case forward through discovery. Within two months of the
28 Court’s order, Class Counsel had won several discovery disputes to compel AmGen
to produce internal documents related to its practices for redetermining UL interest

1 rates. Dkts. 53, 60. These documents included Policy pricing memoranda, AmGen’s
2 historic credited rate analysis memoranda, historic interest rate tables, and policy-
3 level transaction and cash flow history. These documents were critical to class
4 certification and the merits, and many would have become exhibits at trial. Bridgman
5 Decl. ¶14.

6 Following the filing and litigation of this lawsuit, AmGen made a positive,
7 substantive change for policyholders, even before the Settlement was reached. In
8 particular, Class Counsel uncovered that while AmGen publicly disclosed to
9 policyholders on annual statements that it credited just one type of interest rate (the
10 “New Money” or “New Premiums” rate); internally, AmGen used *two* interest rates
11 to determine the amount of interest to credit—the New Money rate applicable to
12 premium payments received within the past 36 months, and a “Portfolio” rate
13 applicable to premiums that have been in accumulation values for longer than 36
14 months. But AmGen never previously disclosed the “Portfolio” rate, meaning that
15 the only interest rate policyholders were aware of was not the “true” rate AmGen
16 used to make interest payments. Class Counsel filed the Third Amended Complaint
17 to include allegations related to AmGen’s “Portfolio” rate (whose redeterminations
18 Plaintiff alleged were also not “based only on EFIE”). Dkt. 81.

19 AmGen appears to have changed its disclosure policy for its Portfolio rate,
20 following this litigation. Beginning in 2022, AmGen now discloses both its “New
21 Money” *and* its “Portfolio” interest rates to policyholders on annual statements.
22 Bridgman Decl. ¶18, Ex. 4. This increased transparency occurred before the parties
23 had begun settlement discussions, and is a positive change for all AmGen
24 policyholders—regardless of whether they are in the Class. While Class Counsel
25 does not seek an additional fee for this increased transparency, other courts have
26 awarded just that when included as part of a settlement. *See Skochin v. Genworth*
27 *Fin., Inc.*, 2020 WL 6708388, at *2 (E.D. Va. Nov. 13, 2020) (awarding \$2 million
28 in fees specifically for “efforts in securing” “enhanced disclosures regarding

1 Defendants’ plans to raise premiums in the future” against a life insurance company,
2 as well as an additional percentage of the monetary relief).

3 **C. Class Counsel Pursued Extensive Fact and Expert Discovery in**
4 **Order to Prepare For Trial**

5 This complex class action involving technical issues about AmGen’s
6 administration of its UL policies required substantial discovery. All told, Class
7 Counsel served 37 requests for production of documents, 16 interrogatories, and 60
8 requests for admission, resulting in the production and review of over 163,000 pages
9 of documents, spreadsheets, and data sets. Class Counsel also subpoenaed AmGen’s
10 external auditor, yielding an additional 3,524 pages of important documents.
11 Bridgman Decl. ¶15. Class Counsel took and defended numerous depositions,
12 including those of AmGen’s and Plaintiff’s corporate representatives. Class Counsel
13 also responded to 12 interrogatories and 40 requests for production of documents
14 from AmGen, working closely with the Plaintiff to produce all relevant documents
15 requested. *Id.*

16 Given this case’s complexities, discovery required significant work with top-
17 notch insurance, actuarial, and economics experts—each of whom Class Counsel
18 identified and retained. In addition to several consulting experts, Class Counsel
19 worked with three testifying experts: economist Robert Mills; insurance expert Kevin
20 Fry (the former head of the Illinois Department of Insurance); and actuarial expert
21 and Fellow of the Society of Actuaries, Linley Baker. AmGen designated insurance
22 and actuarial expert Craig Reynolds. Class Counsel took or defended the deposition
23 of all four experts, and the parties produced eight expert reports in total. *Id.*

24 **D. Class Counsel Won Certification of the Issues Class and Litigated**
25 **the Case to the Eve of Trial**

26 Plaintiff filed its motion for class certification on February 10, 2022, and its
27 reply on April 25, 2022. Collectively, Class Counsel prepared and filed 37 pages of
28 briefing supported by 23 exhibits totaling hundreds of pages. *Id.* ¶19. After a
hearing, the Court granted-in-part Plaintiff’s motion on August 4, 2022, certifying a

1 California class on the issue of AmGen’s liability for breach. The Court declined to
2 certify a damages class under Rule 23(b)(3), holding that individualized damages
3 issues predominated over common ones, and ruled that damages would be
4 determined separately following resolution of AmGen’s liability. Dkt. 113 at 20.
5 The Court appointed “experienced counsel” Susman Godfrey as Class Counsel,
6 noting how it had helped Plaintiff “prosecute[] the action vigorously” thus far. *Id.* at
7 22. The Court set trial for November 29, 2022. Dkt. 114.

8 The parties continued litigating vigorously after class certification. Most of
9 expert discovery occurred after class certification, including the initial reports and
10 depositions of three of the four testifying experts. Class Counsel also opposed
11 AmGen’s motion for summary judgment, filing over 1,400 pages of exhibits in
12 opposition. Dkt. 140. In preparation for trial, Class Counsel filed a motion to exclude
13 the opinions of AmGen’s only insurance expert, and opposed AmGen’s motion to
14 exclude Plaintiff’s insurance expert. Class Counsel also filed seven motions *in limine*
15 to cabin the scope of evidence at trial. Bridgman Decl. ¶¶22–25. The parties were
16 ready to present argument on AmGen’s motion for summary judgment and the
17 parties’ *Daubert* motions at the hearing scheduled for November 14, 2022, and to
18 resolve any final issues at the Final Pretrial Conference scheduled for November 21,
19 2022.

20 **E. Class Counsel Negotiated a Highly Successful Settlement**

21 The parties did not reach agreement on the Settlement’s terms until well after
22 completing briefing on summary judgment and *Daubert*, and just two weeks before
23 trial. *Id.* ¶28. An all-day mediation session before Judge Feess (Ret.) was held on
24 September, 29, 2022. *Id.* ¶27. While the parties submitted detailed mediation
25 statements and exhibits ahead of the session, they could not reach an agreement
26 during that session. With Judge Feess’s assistance, the parties continued negotiating
27 after the session, including through the filing of multiple rounds of pretrial documents
28 like witness and exhibit lists and motions *in limine*.

1 Throughout negotiations, Class Counsel made clear to AmGen its readiness
2 and willingness to try this case. Class Counsel also consistently pushed for a relief
3 structure that would significantly and directly compensate the Class for the claims at
4 issue (e.g., historic interest underpayments). The parties, with the mediator’s
5 oversight, discussed whether the case could be resolved nationwide, after which
6 AmGen provided additional data that permitted Plaintiff and Class Counsel to
7 evaluate the feasibility and amount of a nationwide settlement. *Id.* The parties did
8 not sign a Term Sheet until November 14, 2022.

9 In total, the \$55.5 million Settlement is equal to over 44% of the amount of
10 AmGen’s total historic interest underpayments to the Policies under Plaintiff’s theory
11 of liability (which AmGen contested).² In particular, the Settlement’s monetary
12 benefits include:

- 13 • A \$13 million, non-reversionary Settlement Fund. This is not a claims-
14 made settlement. Class Members will automatically receive checks without
15 having to submit any paperwork.
- 16 • \$42.5 million in additional interest payments, on a non-discounted basis, to
17 the accumulation value of In-Force Policies provided through an Interest
18 Rate Bonus and Portfolio Rate Benefit. For four years, AmGen has agreed
19 to: (1) increase the interest rate on Class Members’ In Force Policies so that
20 they will be paid more money in interest; and (2) “lock in” the spread that
21 AmGen can earn on the difference between AmGen’s Portfolio benchmark
22 “earned rate”³ and the Portfolio interest rate such that the spread cannot
23 exceed certain amounts. The spreads are either those that AmGen set at
24

25
26 ² Plaintiff’s expert analyzed the nationwide data AmGen provided and calculated that
27 the total amount of interest allegedly underpaid to the Class per Plaintiff’s theory of
28 breach was approximately \$125.7 million. Dkt. 215-3, ¶7.

³ Plaintiff alleged that the Portfolio benchmark “earned rate” is equivalent to
AmGen’s EFIE such that the “only” consideration AmGen can base redeterminations
of interest rates on is its benchmark earned rate.

1 product pricing or those that were in effect in November 2022, whichever
 2 is smaller.⁴

3 Interest Rate Bonus Amounts

4 Time Period	Bonus Amount
5 Year 1	0.80%
6 Year 2	0.70%
7 Year 3	0.60%
Year 4	0.50%

8 Portfolio Rate Benefit “Locked In” Spreads

9 Product	Spread Temporary (bps)
10 ContinUL	110
11 Elite Survivor G	60
Elite Universal Life G	60
12 Elite Universal Life G 2003	60
13 Platinum Survivor Ultra G	75
Elite Transition UL	46
14 Elite UL	81
Elite Universal Life 2003	56
15 Platinum Provider Ultra 2003	71

16 At the preliminary approval hearing, the Court inquired about the likelihood
 17 that Class Members would receive these interest rate benefits. The answer is that
 18 every Class Member with an In-Force policy is **guaranteed** to receive this additional
 19 interest. Every Policy earns interest on its accumulation value through the normal
 20 operation of the Policy. The Interest Rate Bonus and Portfolio Rate Benefit increase
 21 the interest rates that Class Members are already earning, thereby increasing their
 22 accumulation values. As counsel for AmGen stated at the preliminary approval
 23 hearing when asked about “potential payout”:

24 “It’s pretty definitive that, given the way the bonus is structured and
 25 locking in the spread, **that these amounts will be paid into the cash
 26 value of the policies.** As long as these policies are in force, there’s no
 27 reason to believe we’re going to have some kind of mass termination of

28 ⁴ By requiring AmGen to earn lower spreads than it otherwise could have by “locking in” current spreads or those set at pricing, this benefit further increases the interest Class Members earn on In-Force Policies. See Dkt. 215-3, ¶12.

1 the policies. **There is a 100% likelihood that the accumulation value**
2 **of the policies will be impacted positively by the settlement.”**

3 Ex. 5 (emphasis added).

4 Plaintiff’s expert, Mr. Robert Mills, has independently confirmed the \$42.5
5 million valuation through the data AmGen provided during negotiations. Dkt. 215-3.

6 Indeed, the “100% likelihood” of a positive impact on accumulation values
7 (e.g., increases to them) was a key component that Class Counsel pushed for, and
8 secured, during negotiations. This is not a case where the settlement provides a
9 coupon, or another dubious form of relief that may be of little to no value to most
10 class members or is unrelated to the defendant’s alleged misconduct. Exactly the
11 opposite: the relief secured directly remedies the wrongs alleged. Plaintiff claimed
12 that AmGen paid interest rates on the Policies lower than what was contractually
13 required; in response, the Settlement raises those interest rates so that Class Members
14 receive higher interest payments on their In-Force Policies, in addition to
15 distributions from a Settlement Fund. And as AmGen’s counsel explained, there is
16 no reason why there would be a “mass termination” of these Policies and, in fact,
17 these benefits ensure that Policies remain in force longer. Higher accumulation
18 values means increased amounts available to pay for Policy premiums, permitting
19 Class Members to pay less out of pocket. *See* Dkt. 140-8, ¶10 (Expert Report of
20 Kevin Fry). And because the increased interest credited compounds over time, the
21 benefits likely extend well beyond the initial four-year period.

22 Also, the Settlement releases claims against AmGen only through the period
23 for which the Interest Rate Bonus and Portfolio Rate Benefit are in effect. If, after
24 those bonuses expire, a Class Member believes that AmGen is under-crediting
25 interest, or is otherwise breaching the Policies’ terms with regard to that provision, a
26 new suit can be brought. Bridgman Decl. ¶32.

27 Finally, on top of the \$55.5 million in monetary benefits, the Settlement also
28 provides significant non-monetary relief that increases the Settlement’s gross
29 benefits. AmGen has agreed not to deny coverage of any Class Members’ death

1 claims because of an alleged lack of insurable interest (the “Non-Contestability
2 Benefit”). Class Members benefit because AmGen may not take these actions
3 challenging the payment of death benefits to try to indirectly unwind the Settlement’s
4 benefits. AmGen has likewise agreed not to recoup the cost of this Settlement
5 through a cost of insurance increase or by adjusting its methodology for calculating
6 its benchmark earned rates.

7 Mr. Philip Bieluch, an expert with extensive experience in the life insurance
8 industry has quantified the value of the Non-Contestability benefit at \$9.24 million.
9 Bieluch Decl. ¶40. As a result, the combined monetary and non-monetary benefits
10 conferred by the Settlement total \$64.74 million.

11 **III. ARGUMENT**

12 **A. Class Counsel’s Fee Request is Reasonable**

13 **1. Class Counsel is Entitled to Fees as a Percentage of Recovery**

14 The Supreme Court has long recognized that a lawyer who obtains recovery
15 “for the benefit of persons other than himself or his client is entitled to a reasonable
16 attorney’s fee from the fund as a whole.” *Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert*, 444 U.S. 472,
17 478 (1980); Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(h). The Court has discretion to use either a percentage-
18 of-recovery method or a lodestar method to award fees, but the percentage method in
19 common fund cases is dominant in the Ninth Circuit. *See In re Snap Inc. Secs. Litig.*,
20 2021 WL 667590, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 18, 2021). 25% of the recovery is the
21 benchmark upon which courts evaluate percentage recoveries in the Ninth Circuit,
22 and awards at or below that percentage are a “presumptively reasonable amount of
23 attorney’s fees,” regardless of the lodestar. *Thompson v. Transamerica Life Ins. Co.*,
24 2020 WL 6145104, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2020) (approving fee request of 20%
25 of net settlement fund with 4.2 lodestar multiplier); *Reyes v. Experian Info. Solutions,*
26 *Inc.*, 856 F. App’x 108, 111 (9th Cir. 2021) (court abused discretion when it awarded
27 only 16.67% instead of 25% of recovery because a 2.88 multiplier was not
28 unreasonable and “similar lodestars are routinely approved”).

1 If a lodestar cross-check is undertaken, multipliers under four are presumed
2 reasonable. *E.g.*, *Vizcaino*, 290 F.3d at 1051 n.6 (noting that “multiples ranging
3 from one to four are frequently awarded in common fund cases when the lodestar
4 method is applied” in approving fee award with a 3.65 multiplier (cleaned up));
5 *Thompson*, 2020 WL 6145104, at *1 (approving 4.2 multiplier and collecting cases);
6 *Steiner v. Am. Broad. Co.*, 248 F. App’x 780, 783 (9th Cir. 2007) (affirming fee
7 award equal to 6.85 multiplier because it fell “well within the range of multipliers
8 that courts have allowed”).

9 **2. The Requested Fee is Reasonable Considering the Significant**
10 **Risks Borne by Counsel**

11 In assessing reasonableness, courts consider: “(1) the results achieved; (2) the
12 risk of litigation; (3) the skill required and the quality of work; (4) the contingent
13 nature of the fee and the financial burden on class counsel; and (5) awards made in
14 similar cases.” *Thompson*, 2020 WL 6145104, at *2. “Foremost among these
15 considerations, however, is the benefit obtained for the class.” *In re Bluetooth*
16 *Headset Prods. Liab. Litig.*, 654 F.3d 935, 942 (9th Cir. 2011). An excellent result
17 for the class—especially in light of the obstacles faced—merits a higher fee.

18 i. The results achieved are exceptional

19 Here, the \$55.5 million monetary Settlement, considered in isolation of other
20 benefits secured, is exceptional. The recovery represents 44.2% of the total
21 underpaid interest that Plaintiff alleged AmGen owed Class Members. That
22 percentage increases to 51.5% when the Settlement’s monetary and non-monetary
23 benefits are combined. When compared to other class action settlements, this
24 recovery is an exceptionally high percentage of a defendant’s total potential liability.
25 Indeed, “it is not uncommon for a class action settlement to amount to approximately
26 10% of the total potential value.” *Ma v. Covidien Holding, Inc.*, 2014 WL 2472316,
27 at *3 (C.D. Cal. May 30, 2014) (approving settlement potentially worth 9.1% of total
28 liability as “within the range of reasonableness”).

1 Courts have noted that similar, and even materially lower, percentage
2 recoveries than obtained here weigh in favor of an upward departure from the Ninth
3 Circuit’s 25 percent benchmark. *See, e.g., Marshall*, 2020 WL 5668935, at *2–*3
4 (citing cases where recoveries between 10% to 27.6% of maximum recovery justified
5 upward departure from benchmark); *Hurtado v. Rainbow Disposal Co.*, 2021 WL
6 2327858, at *4 (C.D. Cal. May 21, 2021) (settlement “between 23.4% and 34.0% of
7 the maximum” recovery justified upward adjustment); *Anthem, Inc. Data Breach*
8 *Litigation*, 2018 WL 3960068 at *9–10 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2018) (14.5% recovery
9 justified a percentage fee of 27%).

10 Here, Class Counsel is not requesting any upward departure, rendering its fee
11 request as more than just reasonable: the fees requested are 14.4% of the Settlement’s
12 \$55.5 million in monetary benefits considered alone, and 12.4% of the Settlement’s
13 overall benefits combined. Indeed, this Settlement is functionally equivalent to the
14 benefits secured by the class in *Thompson v. Transamerica Life Ins. Co.*, where Judge
15 Snyder approved fees totaling \$19 million—representing 20% of the monetary relief
16 obtained, with a lodestar multiplier of 4.2. *See* 2020 WL 6145104, at *2. The
17 *Thompson* class alleged breach-of-contract claims against a life insurer for
18 improperly increasing their cost-of-insurance rates. The settlement provided that
19 compensation to class members would be through a “credit [to] the accumulation
20 account of Settlement Class Policies that are in-force” or through “a check in the case
21 of terminated or lapsed” policies. *Thompson v. Transamerica Life Ins. Co.*, Case No.
22 2:18-cv-05422-CAS-GJS, Dkt. 158, ¶39 (C.D. Cal. July 20, 2020); *see also Feller v.*
23 *Transamerica Life Ins. Co.*, 2019 WL 6605886, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2019)
24 (approving \$27.688 million fee—representing 25% of settlement—where in-force
25 policyholders would be paid through “an increase to the accumulation value of each
26 In-Force Policy”). Here, *all* class members will receive a cash disbursement and, as
27 noted (and like in *Thompson* and *Feller*), the additional interest payments from
28 AmGen are guaranteed to “be paid into the cash value of the policies.” Ex. 5.

1 Similarly, in *Herrera v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.*, 2021 WL 9374975, at *11
2 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2021), the Court awarded \$23.1 million in fees from a total
3 settlement value of between \$84 million and \$107.5 million—split between a \$45
4 million settlement fund, \$33.36 million in additional payments the defendant
5 represented it had made or will make directly to class members, \$5.5 million in notice
6 and administrative costs, and the possibility of another \$23.47 million in future
7 refunds as part of a change in business practices. Judge Selna held that the total value
8 of the settlement was “significantly higher than [the] \$45 million” settlement fund,
9 and that the requested \$23.1 million in fees represented at most “27.5% of the total
10 settlement value” and was reasonable. *Id.* at *12.

11 The recovery is even more significant considering the enhanced interest rate
12 disclosures and improved annual statement transparency that AmGen adopted during
13 this case. *Skochin*, 2020 WL 6708388, at *2 (awarding fees for settlement securing
14 “enhanced disclosures”); *Green v. Lawrence Serv. Co.*, 2014 WL 12778929, at *9
15 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2014) (change in a defendant’s policies can be considered in
16 motion for attorneys’ fees even if not part of settlement).

17 It is well-settled that “[i]n calculating the overall settlement value for purposes
18 of the ‘percentage of the recovery’ approach, Courts include the value of the both the
19 monetary and non-monetary benefits conferred on the Class.” *Fleisher v. Phoenix*
20 *Life Ins. Co.*, 2015 WL 10847814, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2015) (citing cases and
21 considering valuation of a non-contestability benefit when awarding fees); *Staton v.*
22 *Boeing*, 327 F.3d 938, 974 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that when non-monetary relief
23 “can be accurately ascertained,” courts may “include such relief as part of the value
24 of a common fund for purposes of applying the percentage method of determining
25 fees”).⁵

26
27 ⁵ See also Federal Judicial Center, *Managing Class Action Litigation: A Pocket*
28 *Guide for Judges* 35 (3d ed. 2010) (stating that, under the percentage approach, the fee “is based on a percentage of the actual value to the class of any settlement fund plus the actual value of any nonmonetary relief”).

1 Finally, the recovery is also exceptional given how quickly Class Members
2 will receive compensation. This is not a claims-made settlement. Class Members
3 will automatically receive checks through the addresses that AmGen keeps on file.
4 Similarly, the Interest Rate Bonus and Portfolio Rate Benefit apply automatically to
5 all Class Members' accumulation values through AmGen's administrative systems,
6 once again without the need to submit any claim form.

7 ii. Class Counsel successfully navigated the high risks
8 associated with this case on a fully contingent fee
9 arrangement

10 Class Counsel overcame very high risks in securing the Settlement on the eve
11 of trial. This litigation focused on the under-crediting of interest to UL policies
12 through improper interest rate redeterminations, a case that Class Counsel—who has
13 extensive experience litigating against life insurers—is unaware has ever been
14 brought before. *Id.* ¶8. Bringing a case that others have not brought previously
15 indicates the high risks of a potential recovery. *E.g., In re Apple Inc. Device*
16 *Performance Litig.*, 2023 WL 2090981, at *14 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 17, 2023)
17 (successfully settling a case involving a “relatively unique subject matter” warranted
18 upward adjustment). That risk was underscored when the Court initially dismissed
19 the case, requiring Plaintiff to go back to the drawing board and find evidence
20 sufficient to show, at the pleading stage, “a fuller picture of how Defendant’s interest
21 rates changed over time relative to its investment returns, or what returns could have
22 been reasonably expected when a redetermination was made.” Dkt. 34 at 4
23 (dismissing Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint, and ordering amendment within 14
24 days). It was by no means certain that Plaintiff’s efforts to bolster its complaint
25 would pay off, given that AmGen’s renewed motion to dismiss vigorously contested
26 even the adequacy of these supplemented allegations.

27 Once the case survived the pleading stage and progressed through discovery
28 and class certification, recovery was still far from guaranteed. While the Court

1 certified an issue class, without a certified damages class, policyholders faced
2 significant challenges in recovering any meaningful relief. As the Court recognizes,
3 “Plaintiff faced several risks in terms of presenting a theory of damages that would
4 survive summary judgment, defending against attempts by Defendant to decertify the
5 class after the trial, and converting a liability judgment into actual damages.” Dkt
6 217 at 2. A defendant as well-resourced as AmGen, with highly skilled counsel, had
7 every reason to believe it would prevail at summary judgment or trial, especially after
8 the Ninth Circuit decided to not review Plaintiff’s 23(f) appeal of the Court’s class
9 certification decision. *See Churchill Vill., L.L.C. v. Gen. Elec.*, 361 F.3d 566, 576
10 (9th Cir. 2004) (the defendant’s belief in the strength of its case properly considered
11 as a risk to recovery); Bridgman Decl. ¶20.

12 “The risk that further litigation might result in no recovery is a ‘significant
13 factor’ in assessing the fairness and reasonableness of an award of attorneys’ fees.”
14 *Taylor v. Shippers Transport Express, Inc.*, 2015 WL 12658458, at *15 (C.D. Cal.
15 May 14, 2015) (citation omitted); *accord In re Pac. Enters. Secs. Litig.*, 47 F.3d 373,
16 379 (9th Cir. 1995) (affirming 33% fee “because of the complexity of the issues and
17 the risks”). Here, the risk of there being no recovery at all was very high. Even if
18 Plaintiff prevailed at both summary judgment and trial, that would still not have
19 entitled the Class to a penny. Victory on the issue of breach would only have meant
20 additional litigation by absent Class Members interested and willing to litigate their
21 individual damages’ claims.

22 Class Counsel continued litigating this case, retaining highly specialized
23 experts on UL policies, and helping them prepare their expert reports and their
24 testimony for trial. Class Counsel opposed AmGen’s motion for summary judgment,
25 and proceeded deep into trial preparation activities when this Settlement was
26 finalized.

27 Class Counsel undertook all of these risks on a fully contingent basis, without
28 there ever being any guarantee of any recovery. “The risk that counsel will not

1 recover, as well as the financial burden accompanying the contingent nature of the
2 representation, may justify a higher percentage fee award.” *Taylor*, 2015 WL
3 12658458, at *16.

4 iii. Courts have approved similar percentage awards in breach-
5 of-contract cases against life insurers.

6 Class Counsel’s request for 14.4% is well within the range that courts have
7 awarded in other cases involving breach-of-contract claims against life insurers. *See*,
8 *e.g.*, *Feller*, 2019 WL 6605886 at *13 (approving 25% of monetary benefits);
9 *Thompson*, 2020 WL 6145104, at *2 (approving 20% monetary benefits); *Fleisher*,
10 2015 WL 10847814, at *11 (approving award equal to 33.3% of monetary benefits);
11 *37 Besen Parkway, LLC v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co.*, 15-cv-9924, Dkt. 164 at
12 20:08–10 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 2019) (approving 30% of monetary benefits); *Brighton*
13 *Trustees, LLC v. Genworth Life and Annuity Ins. Co.*, 3:20-cv-00240-DJN, at Dkt.
14 147 (E.D. Va. Oct. 25, 2022) (approving fees equal to 33.33% of the monetary
15 benefits).

16 **3. The Fee Requested is Reasonable Under the Lodestar**
17 **Crosscheck**

18 While courts are encouraged to confirm the reasonableness of a percentage fee
19 request by cross-checking the lodestar multiplier, they are not required to. *See Craft*
20 *v. County of San Bernardino*, 624 F. Supp. 2d 1113, 1123 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2008)
21 (“A lodestar cross-check is not required in this circuit, and in some cases is not a
22 useful reference point.”). A court may “decline[] to conduct a lodestar cross-check
23 in [a] case, given that under the percentage-of-the-fund method the fee request [is]
24 significantly below the 25% benchmark.” *Ebarle v. Lifelock, Inc.*, 2016 WL 5076203,
25 at *11 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2016); *Glass v. UBS Fin. Servs., Inc.*, 2007 WL 221862,
26 at *15 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2007) (no cross-check in approving an \$11.25 million fee
27 because the fee was 25% of the recovery).
28

1 Here, Class Counsel’s request of 14.4% is below the 25% benchmark and is
2 presumptively reasonable. With a lodestar of 3.32 for the work completed through
3 March 15, 2023, which will lower to 2.95 through settlement administration, *see*
4 Bridgman Decl. ¶44, the cross-check only confirms the reasonableness of the
5 requested award. *See, e.g., Vizcaino*, 290 F.3d at 1051 (affirming fee with multiplier
6 of 3.65 and collecting cases); *Steiner*, 248 F. App’x at 783 (approving 6.87
7 multiplier); *Reyes*, 856 F. App’x at 111 (25% award with a 2.88 multiplier was not
8 unreasonable); *Craft*, 624 F. Supp. 2d at 1125 (approving 25% award with 5.2
9 multiplier).

10 In this entirely contingent action, Class Counsel have spent 3,216.30 hours
11 through March 15, 2023, for a lodestar amount of \$2,408,870.00.⁶ Bridgman Decl.
12 ¶¶36–37. The hourly rates for Class Counsel and its staff (ranging from \$325 to
13 \$1,300) are comparable to peer law firms litigating matters of similar magnitude. In
14 a survey of AmLaw 50 law firms performed by PwC Product Sales, LLC and issued
15 in October 2021, the median billing rate per hour was \$1,253 for equity partners and
16 \$819 for associates. *Id.* ¶39. Here, three of the four Susman Godfrey partners who
17 primarily worked on this case had rates below the 2021 median. All associates
18 working on the matter billed below the median rate. *Id.*

19 Courts routinely find Susman Godfrey’s rates reasonable. *See, e.g., Flo &*
20 *Eddie, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc.*, 2017 WL 4685536, at *8–*9 (C.D. Cal. May 8,
21 2017) (finding Susman Godfrey’s rates “reasonable because they fall within the range
22 of prevailing rates in the Central District of California for the type of work
23 performed”); *Meta Platforms, Inc. v. Social Data Trading Ltd.*, 2022 WL 18806267

24
25 ⁶ In the Ninth Circuit, “affidavits of the plaintiffs’ attorneys and other attorneys
26 regarding prevailing fees in the community, and rate determinations in other cases
27 are satisfactory evidence of the prevailing market rate.” *Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin.,*
28 *Inc.*, 523 F.3d 973, 980 (9th Cir. 2008) (cleaned up). The lodestar is calculated using
Susman Godfrey’s 2023 hourly rates. *See Missouri v. Jenkins*, 491 U.S. 274, 283–84
(1989) (endorsing “an appropriate adjustment for delay in payment” by applying
“current” rate); *Wishtoyo Foundation v. United Water Conservation Dist.*, 2019 WL
1109684, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2019) (using current rates to determine fee award).

1 at *5 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 11, 2022) (Susman Godfrey’s rates were “reasonable” and
2 “consistent with the prevailing market rates for attorneys of similar skill, experience,
3 and reputation”); *Fleisher*, 2015 WL 10847814, at *18 (Susman Godfrey’s rates were
4 “reasonable” and “comparable to peer plaintiffs and defense-side law firms litigating
5 matters of similar magnitude”); *In re Auto. Parts Antitrust Litig.*, 2017 WL 3525415,
6 at *4 (E.D. Mich. July 10, 2017) (Susman Godfrey’s rates were “justified” and “well
7 in line with market”).

8 The 3,216.30 hours Class Counsel spent litigating over two years are also
9 reasonable. Class Counsel sought discovery relevant to both class certification and
10 the merits as soon as practicable, and elevated the work of associates where
11 appropriate. For example, an associate took the deposition of AmGen’s 30(b)(6)
12 corporate representative and defended the depositions of Plaintiff’s experts in this
13 case. Moreover, when using the lodestar as a cross-check, “courts ‘have generally
14 not been required to closely scrutinize each claimed attorney-hour, but have instead
15 used information on attorney time spent to focus on the general question of whether
16 the fee award appropriately reflects the degree of time and effort expended by the
17 attorneys.’” *De Leon v. Ricoh USA, Inc.*, 2020 WL 1531331, at *15 (N.D. Cal. Mar.
18 31, 2020) (quoting *Laffitte v. Robert Half Int’l Inc.*, 1 Cal. 5th 480, 505 (2016)).

19 Finally, the current 3.32 multiplier does not account for *future* hours that Class
20 Counsel will need to work to ensure that all Class Members receive the Settlement
21 relief, including time that will be spent preparing papers in support of final approval,
22 shepherding the notice and disbursement process, and administering the Settlement
23 until all funds are distributed. In a Class of over 40,500, from experience in handling
24 class action settlements of similar size, Class Counsel anticipates being required to
25 respond to inquiries from Class Members during administration. That additional
26 work would bring the effective lodestar in this matter to 2.95. *See Reyes*, 856 F.
27 App’x at 111 (2.88 multiplier was reasonable). *Bridgman Decl.* ¶44.

28

1 Courts consider expected future hours worked when assessing the
2 reasonableness of a lodestar cross-check. *See Perez v. Rash Curtis & Assocs.*, 2020
3 WL 1904533, at *20 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2020) (considering counsel’s averment that
4 there will be an additional 5,450 hours spent on the case when awarding fees equaling
5 multiplier of 13.42); *In re Volkswagen “Clean Diesel” Mktg., Sales Practices, and*
6 *Prods. Liab. Litig.*, 746 F. App’x 655, 659 (9th Cir. 2018) (“The district court did not
7 err in including projected time in its lodestar cross-check).

8 **B. Class Counsel’s Expenses Are Reasonable, Were Necessarily**
9 **Incurred to Achieve the Settlement, and Should Be Reimbursed**

10 Class Counsel requests reimbursement of \$363,445.27 for expenses incurred
11 in connection with this action. Bridgman Decl. ¶45. These expenses, including filing
12 fees, legal research charges, deposition costs, and expert fees, are all of the sort that
13 would “normally be charged to a fee paying client” in non-contingent cases. *In re*
14 *Allergan, Inc., Proxy Violation Derivatives Litig.*, 2018 WL 4959014, at *1 (C.D.
15 Cal. Aug. 13, 2018) (citation omitted) (approving \$756,983.55 in expenses in case
16 that recovered \$40 million for the class).

17 Class Counsel advanced expenses without any assurance they would ever be
18 reimbursed given the contingent nature of the case. That Class Counsel was willing
19 to spend its own money (without using outside funding), and where reimbursement
20 depended entirely on this litigation’s success, is perhaps the best indicator that
21 expenditures were reasonable, necessary, and economical where appropriate.

22 Class Counsel also requests the Court approve payment of Settlement
23 Administration Expenses under paragraph 56 of the Settlement. The Settlement
24 Administrator has incurred \$3,048.35 in expenses through February 28, 2023, and
25 will incur additional expenses as payments are distributed. Intrepido-Bowden Decl.
26 ¶¶ 3–4.

27 **C. A Service Award for Plaintiff is Appropriate**
28

1 Plaintiff requests a service award of \$25,000 for being the class representative,
2 which is 0.04% of the Settlement’s monetary value. A service award is meant to
3 compensate class representatives “for work done on behalf of the class, to make up
4 for financial or reputational risk undertaken in bringing the action, and sometimes, to
5 recognize their willingness to act as a private attorney general.” *Rodriguez v. West*
6 *Publishing Corp.*, 563 F.3d 948, 958–59 (9th Cir. 2009). Factors are considered: (1)
7 the risk to the class representative in commencing suit; (2) the notoriety and personal
8 difficulties encountered; (3) the amount of time and effort spent; (4) the duration of
9 the litigation; and (5) the personal benefit (or lack thereof) enjoyed as a result of the
10 litigation. *See Flo & Eddie*, 2017 WL 4685536, at *10.

11 Here, Plaintiff’s risk was greater risk than normal given the case was the first
12 to involve the complicated interest rate provision at issue. Plaintiff spent significant
13 time gathering and reviewing documents to respond to AmGen’s discovery requests,
14 prepared for and attended a day-long deposition, and advised the settlement process.
15 Without Plaintiff bringing this case, or its involvement in helping settle the case, most
16 Class Members would not be receiving any relief. As this Court has now noted twice,
17 Plaintiff has litigated this case “vigorously” on behalf of the Class. Dkt. 113 at 22,
18 Dkt. 217 at 2.

19 The \$25,000 request is in line with those awarded in other complex class
20 actions involving UL policies. *See, e.g., Hancock*, 15-cv-9924, Dkt. 164 at 21:2–4
21 (approving \$40,000 service awards); *Fleisher*, 2015 WL 10847814, at *24 (\$25,000);
22 *Brighton Trustees*, 3:20-cv-00240-DJN, at Dkt. 147 (\$25,000). It is also in line with
23 those awarded in other complex class actions securing similarly sized settlements in
24 this district. *E.g., Waldbuesser v. Northrop Grumman Corp.*, 2017 WL 9614818, at
25 *8 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2017) (\$25,000 service award for securing a \$16.75 million
26 recovery; and awarding class counsel \$5.58 million in fees and \$1.16 million in
27 expenses); *Tibble v. Edison Int’l*, 2018 WL 6131151, at *2 (C.D. Cal. June 25, 2018)
28 (\$25,000 service award after proving damages of over \$13 million at trial); *Flo &*

1 *Eddie*, 2017 WL 4685536, at *11 (\$25,000 service award, which represented “only
2 .2 percent of the \$25.5 million minimum recovery”).

3 **IV. CONCLUSION**

4 For the foregoing reasons, Class Counsel respectfully requests that this Court
5 award its requested attorneys’ fees in the amount of \$8,000,000, plus a *pro rata* share
6 of the interest earned in the Fund, reimbursement of \$363,445.27 in litigation
7 expenses, and a \$25,000 service award for Plaintiff LSIMC, LLC.

8

9 Dated: April 3, 2023

Respectfully submitted,

10

11

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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

The undersigned, Class Counsel, certifies that this brief contains 6,894 words, which complies with the word limit of L.R. 11-6.1.

Dated: April 3, 2023

/s/ Glenn C. Bridgman
Glenn C. Bridgman